

**FILED**

FEB 07 2022

Clerk of the Court  
Superior Court of CA County of Santa Clara  
BY R. Belligan DEPUTY

**SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA**

CITY OF HALF MOON,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GRANADA COMMUNITY SERVICES  
DISTRICT and MONTARA WATER AND  
SANITARY DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.

and

SEWER AUTHORITY MID-COASTSIDE,

Real Party in Interest.

MONTARA WATER AND SANITARY  
DISTRICT,

Cross-Complainant,

v.

CITY OF HALF MOON BAY,

Cross-Defendant,

and

GRANADA COMMUNITY SERVICES  
DISTRICT; SEWER AUTHORITY MID-  
COASTSIDE,

Case No. 17CV316927

ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY  
JUDGMENT, OR IN THE  
ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY  
ADJUDICATION

**Order issued  
on Submitted Matter**

1 GRANADA COMMUNITY SERVICES  
2 DISTRICT,

3 Cross-Complainant,

4 v.

5 CITY OF HALF MOON BAY,

6 Cross-Defendant,

7 and

8 SEWER AUTHORITY MID-COASTSIDE,

9 Real Party in Interest.

10  
11 The following motions came on for hearing before the Honorable Christopher G. Rudy  
12 on January 18, 2021, at 9 a.m. in Department 7: (1) defendant/cross-defendant Montara Water  
13 and Sanitary District's ("Montara") motion for summary judgment as to the complaint  
14 ("Complaint") filed by plaintiff/cross-defendant City of Half Moon Bay (the "City"); (2) the  
15 City's motion for summary judgment as to its own Complaint; and (3) defendant/cross-  
16 complainant Granada Community Services District's ("Granada") motion for summary judgment  
17 as to the City's Complaint and its own cross-complaint ("Cross-Complaint"). Granada joins in  
18 Montara's motion and Montara joins in Granada's. The Court having heard oral argument and  
19 the matters having been submitted, the Court orders as follows:  
20  
21

22 **I. Background**

23 **A. Factual**

24 **1. Complaint**

25  
26 This action arises out of a dispute between various municipalities over their financial  
27 obligations concerning sewer infrastructure for the San Mateo Coast. According to the  
28 allegations of the operative Complaint, on February 3, 1976, the City, Montara and Granada

1 entered into a Joint Exercise Powers Agreement (“JPA”) for the purposes of creating the Sewer  
2 Authority Mid-Coastside Authority (the “Authority”) to construct, own, and operate regional  
3 wastewater facilities for the three communities. (Complaint, ¶ 14 and Exhibit B.) Shortly after  
4 the execution of the JPA, the Authority constructed the Intertie Pipe System (“Intertie”) pursuant  
5 to Phase I of the agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 15.) Intertie is a sewer force main and associated tanks,  
6 pumps, and mechanical and electrical components that convey wastewater from Montara’s and  
7 Granada’s sewer collection systems to the Authority’s treatment plant in the City. Intertie’s  
8 construction, net of state and federal grants, was funded only by Granada and Montara, with the  
9 City assigned no benefit from, and thus no burden to fund, it. (*Id.*)

12 Intertie was constructed to be operated and maintained for its useful life. (Complaint, ¶  
13 17.) While the JPA did not specify the useful life, the JPA foresaw that Intertie would eventually  
14 require replacement. (*Id.*) After four decades of use, critical portions of the Intertie must now be  
15 replaced at a cost of approximately \$4.4 million. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 17-18.) This cost was included by the  
16 Authority in its proposed 2017-2018 General Budget which, if approved and implemented,  
17 would purport to obligate the City to bear approximately half the cost to replace critical portions  
18 of the Intertie. (*Id.*) However, the City does not have any use for, nor right to use the Intertie  
19 and thus no obligation to fund the replacement parts under the JPA. (*Id.*)

22 Under the JPA, a member agency’s share of the Authority’s general fund is based on its  
23 share of flows to the Authority’s plant, while only member agencies participating in a particular  
24 capital project contribute to its budget. (*Id.*, ¶ 19.) The City alleges that under the JPA, the  
25 Intertie replacement is a capital project for which Montara and Granada must approve and  
26 contribute to a project budget, rather than be funded from the general budget. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 20-22.)  
27 Among the factors alleged by the City to support its position are: the age of the Intertie and its  
28

1 finite useful life; the replacement nature of the subject project; the significant cost of the project;  
2 the nature of the costs to be incurred; the City's lack of benefit from the Intertie; and the JPA's  
3 distinction of "construction" from "maintenance and operation." (Complaint, ¶ 25.)  
4

5 The City further alleges that under the JPA, any member may withhold its approval of  
6 capital projects and project budgets. (Complaint, ¶ 26.) The latter requires unanimous approval  
7 of the agencies that benefit from, and are therefore obliged to fund, the associated projects. (*Id.*)  
8 If the City withdraws from a project, it is not obligated to contribute to that project's budget nor  
9 may it benefit from that project. (*Id.*) Accordingly, the City asserts, it may withhold its approval  
10 of the Intertie project budget. (*Id.*, ¶ 27.) The City seeks a declaration that capital projects such  
11 as large-scale pipe replacement do not constitute "operation and maintenance" and the JPA  
12 therefore does not oblige the City to contribute to the cost of the \$4.4 million in Intertie capital  
13 replacement projects via the general budget.  
14

## 15 2. *Granada's Cross-Complaint*

16  
17 Granada takes the opposite position to the City in its Cross-Complaint. According to the  
18 allegations of this pleading, the Authority constructed Intertie in two phases. (Cross-Complaint,  
19 ¶ 17.) Phase I consisted of three components with "capacity rights, construction costs and  
20 operation and maintenance expenses being shared as specified" until these costs were reallocated  
21 as contemplated in Phase II. (*Id.*, ¶ 18.) Intertie was one of the three components, with initial  
22 construction costs shared equally between Montara and Granada. (*Id.*) Phase II, in turn,  
23 consisted of construction of the final component of the Authority's sewer system, which  
24 contemplated one or more wastewater treatment facilities. (*Id.*) Ultimately, the member  
25 agencies chose to construct a single consolidated treatment plant, to which the Authority  
26 connected the then-existing Intertie. (*Id.*)  
27  
28

1 Under the terms of the JPA, and upon the Authority's Board of Directors' decision to  
2 construct a single treatment plant, the member agencies agreed to reallocate the costs and  
3 expenses of the Authority's sewer system, thereby terminating the previous Phase I cost  
4 allocations. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 20.) The member agencies agreed to share the total expenses  
5 of operation and maintenance of all the components of Intertie "based on flows into the single  
6 consolidated treatment plant facility," and that "capacity rights and construction costs previously  
7 allocated in Phase I components shall be reallocated to be consistent with the treatment plant  
8 facility allocations." (*Id.*) As of 2017, the flow allocations consisted of 52% (the City), 26%  
9 (Granada) and 22% (Montara). (*Id.*, ¶ 22.)

12 Granada alleges that contrary to the allegations in the City's Complaint, the City directly  
13 and indirectly utilizes and benefits from Intertie, which transports its wastewater to the  
14 Authority's wastewater treatment plant, and the City receives wastewater flow "priority" there.  
15 (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 23.) Nevertheless, Granada asserts, the JPA Phase II reallocation of the  
16 Authority's sewer system costs and expenses does not rely on a "benefit" calculation, but rather  
17 relies on each member agency's proportion of wastewater flows into the wastewater treatment  
18 plant and their LCP allocations. From the time of Phase II reallocation until the City's June 2017  
19 refusal to approve the Authority's 2017-2018 general budget, Granada pleads, the City has  
20 continually funded the operation and maintenance, including construction, on the Intertie, in  
21 accordance with the reallocation set and agreed to by the member agencies in the JPA. (*Id.*, ¶¶  
22 25-26.)

25 Granada further alleges that under the plain reading of the JPA and the past practice of  
26 the member agencies, the "Project Budget" provisions apply to new improvements not  
27 previously existing. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 30.) Thus, Granada maintains, because three  
28

1 components of the Authority's sewer system components, including Intertie, have been in  
2 existence and continual used and have been functioning for nearly four decades, the project  
3 budget provisions of the JPA are inapplicable to work done on the Intertie. (*Id.*) The 2017-2918  
4 general budget did not envision expanding Intertie or increasing its capacity; it only proposed to  
5 implement a plan to repair and replace certain segments of the Intertie, in line with similarly  
6 funded past repairs and replacements. (*Id.*) The member agencies have regularly and properly  
7 funded work on the existing sewer system, including Intertie, through the general budget. (*Id.*)  
8 Granada seeks a declaration that the City continues to share responsibility for its share of all  
9 costs and expenses related to the Intertie, as reflected in the JPA, as well as an affirmative  
10 declaration that infrastructure work which does not envision expanding the Intertie or increasing  
11 its capacity, but only proposes to implement to repair and replace certain segments of the Intertie  
12 does not require a project budget. (*Id.*, ¶ 31.)

#### 15 **B. Procedural**

16 The City filed its Complaint for declaratory relief in San Mateo County Superior Court  
17 on July 11, 2017. Granada filed its Cross-Complaint for declaratory relief on September 5,  
18 2017.<sup>1</sup> Several weeks later, a motion for mandatory transfer was granted by the San Mateo  
19 County Superior Court, transferring this entire action to this Court. On September 30, 2021, the  
20 instant three motions for summary judgment were filed by the parties. All of the motions are  
21 opposed.<sup>2</sup>

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26  
27 <sup>1</sup> Montara filed a cross-complaint for declaratory relief on August 24, 2017, that is substantively the same as  
Granada's. This pleading is not at issue in Montara's motion.

28 <sup>2</sup> Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties and resulting Court order, Granada and Montara filed a joint  
opposition to the City's motion for summary judgment. The City also filed 9 volumes of joint evidentiary exhibits  
relied on by all parties in support of their motions or oppositions to the motions.

1 **II. Montara's Motion for Summary Judgment**

2 **A. Requests for Judicial Notice**

3 In connection with Montara's motion for summary judgment, Granada, the City and  
4 Montara itself all make requests for judicial notice.  
5

6 First, in support of its motion, Montara requests that the Court take judicial notice of the  
7 existence and contents of the Declarations of Pippin Cavagnaro and Clemens Heldmaier in  
8 support of its opposition to the City's own motion for summary judgment. As these items are  
9 court records, they are proper subjects of judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code section 452,  
10 subdivision (d). Accordingly, Montara's request is GRANTED.  
11

12 Next, in support of its joinder in Montara's motion for summary judgment, Granada  
13 requests that the Court take judicial notice of the City's Complaint (Exhibit A), a court record.  
14 Granada's request is GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)  
15

16 Finally, in connection with its opposition to Montara's motion, the City requests that the  
17 Court take judicial notice of various items attached to the Declaration of John Doughty in  
18 Support of the City's Joint Opposition to Montara's and Granada's motions for summary  
19 judgment, specifically: Staff Report of the January 25, 2010 Authority Board Meeting Agenda  
20 Item No. 6A (Exhibit K); California Regional Water Quality Control Board ("RWQCB") Order  
21 R2-2018-1005, Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Administrative Civil Liability  
22 Order in the matter of Granada's Discharges of Untreated Sewage to Surface Water between  
23 May 2, 2007 and December 31, 2017 (Exhibit L); RWQCB Order R2-2018-1012, Settlement  
24 Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Administrative Civil Liability Order in the matter of the  
25 Authority's Discharges of Untreated Sewage to Surface Water between May 2, 2007 and  
26 December 31, 2017 (Exhibit M); RWQCB Order R2-2018-1022, Settlement Agreement and  
27  
28

1 Stipulation for Entry of Administrative Civil Liability Order in the matter of the Authority's  
2 Discharges of Untreated Sewage to Surface Water between May 2, 2007 and December 31, 2017  
3 (Exhibit N); July 14, 2008 Authority Board Meeting Minutes (Exhibit O); and Authority  
4 Resolution No. 3-2009 (Exhibit P).

6 Government records are judicially noticeable pursuant to Evidence Code sections 451,  
7 subd. (a) and 452, subds. (b) and (c). Evidence Code section 452 provides that the Court may  
8 take judicial notice of "(b) Regulations and legislative enactments issued by or under the  
9 authority of the United States or any public entity in the United States." The Court may notice  
10 relevant portions of a city's or joint powers authority's staff reports and legislative enactments.  
11 (*Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach* (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1225  
12 [judicial notice of staff report]; see *Trinity Park, L.P. v. City of Sunnyvale* (2011) 193  
13 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1027 [applying Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (b) and (c) to "local ordinances and  
14 the official resolutions, reports, and other official acts of a city."]) The authority to take judicial  
15 notice, includes those government records published on the internet. (See, e.g., *People ex rel.*  
16 *Totten v. Colonia Chiques* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 31, 38, fn. 3.) Exhibits K, O, and P fall into  
17 this category.

20 The administrative decisions of the State RWQCB, i.e., Exhibits L, M and N, are also  
21 proper subjects of judicial notice as "[o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial  
22 departments of any state." (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); *Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan,*  
23 *Inc.* (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 484.) Accordingly, the City's request for judicial notice is  
24 GRANTED.



1           **B. Burden of Proof**

2           “A defendant seeking summary judgment [or adjudication] must show that at least one  
3 element of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete  
4 defense to the cause of action ... The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show there is a triable  
5 issue of material fact on that issue.” (*Alex R. Thomas & Co. v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins.*  
6 *Co.* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 66, 72 [internal citations omitted].)

7  
8           “The ‘tried and true’ way for defendants to meet their burden of proof on summary  
9 judgment motions is to present affirmative evidence (declarations, etc.) negating, as a matter of  
10 law, an essential element of plaintiff’s claim.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide; Civ. Proc.  
11 Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2014) ¶ 10:241, p. 10-104, citing *Guz v. Bechtel National,*  
12 *Inc.* (2000) 24 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 317, 334.) “The moving party’s declaration and evidence will be strictly  
13 construed in determining whether they negate (disprove) an essential element of plaintiff’s claim  
14 ‘in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff’s (opposing party’s)  
15 favor.’” (*Id.*, ¶ 10:241.20, p. 10-105, citing *Johnson v. American Standard, Inc.* (2008) 43  
16 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 56, 64.)

17  
18  
19           “Another way for a defendant to obtain summary judgment is to ‘show’ that an essential  
20 element of plaintiff’s claim cannot be established. Defendant does so by presenting evidence  
21 that plaintiff ‘does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence’ (because plaintiff  
22 must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to oppose the motion).” (*Id.*, ¶ 10:242, p. 10-105,  
23 citing *Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (2001) 25 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 826, 854-855.) “Such evidence usually  
24 consists of admissions by plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he or she has  
25 discovered nothing to support an essential element of the cause of action.” (*Id.*)  
26  
27  
28

1           **C. Analysis**

2           The disposition of the instant motion rests on an issue of contractual interpretation. Per  
3 Montara’s motion, the dispute at issue and its position can be summarized thusly: despite all  
4 member agencies of the Authority historically contributing to the cost of repair and replacements  
5 of improvements comprising the intertie pipeline system (“IPS”) as required by the provisions of  
6 the JPA, the City no longer wishes to pay its share based on an interpretation of the JPA that such  
7 repairs and replacements of the IPS are not expenses of operation and maintenance, but rather a  
8 “project” that is to be funded by Montara and Granada only. It is Montara’s position that the City  
9 must pay because maintenance *includes* repair and replacement of segments of the IPS based on  
10 the following: the plain language of the JPA; the context in which the JPA was drafted; the  
11 members’ course of performance; definitions of terms in federal and state regulations that  
12 governed the Authority at inception; and public policy considerations.  
13

14  
15                   1. *Montara’s Undisputed Material Facts*

16           In support of its motion, Montara submits the following purportedly undisputed material  
17 facts  
18

19                   a. Formation of SAM

20           In 1976, real party in interest Sewer Authority Mid-Coast (the “Authority” or “SAM”)  
21 was formed pursuant to the Joint Exercise of Powers Act (Gov. Code, § 6500 et seq.) (the “Act”)  
22 to construct, own and operate regional wastewater treatment works. (Montara’s Separate  
23 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“UMF”)  
24 No. 1.) The Joint Exercise of Powers Act “provides a means by which governmental agencies  
25 may join together to accomplish goals that they could not accomplish alone, or that they might  
26 more efficiently and more effectively accomplish together.” (*Robings v. Santa Monica*  
27  
28

1 *Mountains Conservancy* (2010) 188 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 952, 962.) Under the Act, when authorized by  
2 governing bodies to do so, “two or more public agencies by agreement may jointly exercise any  
3 power common to the contracting parties,” and they main join in the creation of a separate entity  
4 to exercise those powers on their behalf. (Gov. Code § 6502.)

5  
6 In the years preceding SAM’s formation, all three members- Montara, Granada and the  
7 City- were operating separate treatment works. (See Joint Exhibit (“Jt. Ex.”) 14 [“City Reso. No.  
8 11-79”] at p. 1.) However, the City’s and Granada’s systems lacked sufficient capacity to meet  
9 demand, while Montara’s newly constructed system had excess capacity. (*Id.*) Various plans  
10 were considered and rejected, including regional cooperation, separate treatment facilities by  
11 each member but a shared common deep water outfall at the location of the City’s existing  
12 outfall which utilized an intertie pipe system (“IPS” or “Intertie”) (“Plan A”), and full  
13 consolidation with members sharing a single treatment plant, outfall and construction of an IPS  
14 (“Plan F”). (*Id.*) The members were ultimately unable reach a consensus as to how to proceed  
15 because certain plans would have placed disproportionate cost burdens on certain members. The  
16 City therefore proposed sharing the cost of the consolidated system on an equitable basis, and the  
17 three members formed SAM to pursue a true regional approach. (City Reso. 11-79 at p. 2.)

18  
19  
20 b. Development of Consolidated Regional System

21 Working together as SAM, the members pursued a plan under which they would share  
22 use of an outfall and construction of an IPS, as well as a single treatment plant at the location of  
23 the City’s existing plant. (City Reso. No. 11-79 at pp. 3-4.) Encountering difficulty obtaining  
24 permits caused the members to reconsider a plan pursuant to which each would operate its own  
25 treatment facility but share a common deep water ocean outfall at the site of the City’s existing  
26 outfall. After cease and desist orders were imposed on all three members as a result of  
27  
28

1 enforcement of federal and state clean water rules by the San Francisco Bay Regional Water  
2 Quality Control Board (“RWQCB”), meetings were held by all relevant parties to determine a  
3 way forward, and it was agreed that SAM would pursue a regional wastewater treatment system  
4 in two phases. (*Id.* at pp. 4-5; UMF No. 16.) In Phase I, construction would begin on the IPS  
5 and outfall and during that time, the members would decide whether to proceed with separate  
6 plants or a single plant. (*Id.*; UMF No. 11.) The agreement was embodied in a court order  
7 issued in an action against SAM filed by the state Attorney General, and the order contained a  
8 compliance schedule for construction of both phases. (*Id.* at 5; Jt. Ex. 17.)  
9

10  
11 In July 1979, Article IV of SAM’s JPA was amended to incorporate the two-phased  
12 approach. (Jt. Ex. 4; UMF No 9.) The amendment defined both Phase I and Phase II  
13 components of SAM’s proposed regional consolidated wastewater treatment system as the  
14 “Present Project.” (*Id.* at pp. 1, 3; UMF No. 14.) The amendment indicated that in Phase I, the  
15 IPS would be constructed to the shared outfall and would be “shared equally between Montara  
16 and Granada” (UMF No. 12) and the new outfall would be shared “one-half (1/2) by [the City],  
17 one-quarter (1/4) by Montara and one-quarter (1/4) by Granada.” (Jt. Ex. 4 at p. 1; UMF No.  
18 12.)  
19

20 As amended, Article IV(B)(4) also stated that if in Phase II the members chose to pursue  
21 a single consolidated treatment facility, then: “The total expenses of operation and maintenance  
22 of all components of the Present Project [would] be shared in a manner based on flows into the  
23 single consolidated treatment plant facility.” (Jt. Ex. 4 at p 4; UMF No. 13.) In the case of a  
24 shared plant, capacity rights in the Phase I components would be reallocated. (*Id.*) However, if  
25 the members opted to maintain separate wastewater treatment plants, then “[t]he expenses of  
26  
27  
28

1 operation and maintenance of various components of the Present Project” would be “borne solely  
2 by those member agencies using said components.” (*Id.*; UMF No 13.)

3 Cost allocation was discussed by the SAM board before the JPA was amended, with the  
4 City expressing their belief that they should not pay for operation and maintenance (“O&M”) for  
5 the IPS under either Plans A or F. (Jt. Ex 19, p. JE104; UMF No. 15.) After “considerable  
6 discussion,” it was agreed that under Plan F, O&M costs would be shared for all components of  
7 the project by all three agencies based on each agency’s respective flows in the treatment plant,  
8 while under Plan A each agency would share O&M costs of only those components used by that  
9 agency, and then according to flows. (*Id.*)

10  
11  
12 c. Funding of the IPS

13 Ultimately, SAM and its members decided to pursue a single, consolidated wastewater  
14 treatment plant (UMF No. 16), and SAM was awarded grant funding from the state and federal  
15 governments which paid nearly all of the costs of the consolidated system, including the IPS. (Jt.  
16 Ex. 16.) Grant proceeds were conditioned, in part, on compliance with state regulations then in  
17 effect at 40 C.F.R. Chapter I, Subchapter B. (Jt. Ex. 26 at HMB2199, General Cond. (a).)

18  
19 In the years following, SAM members shared financial responsibility for the maintenance  
20 of the IPS pursuant to the general budget provisions of the JPA. (UMF No 17.) For example,  
21 the Budget for Fiscal Year 1983-1984 shows reserves for “capital equipment purchases” and  
22 “repair and replacement” of SAM’s treatment works divided among all three members based on  
23 their flows into the Wastewater Treatment Plant. (Jt Ex. 29, p. 3.) The budgets for Fiscal Years  
24 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 show that funding for operation and maintenance of all components  
25 of the SAM consolidated system were based on the flows. (Declaration of Christine C.  
26 Fitzgerald in Support of Montara’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Fitzgerald Decl.”), ¶ 3,  
27  
28

1 Exs. A, B.) In Fiscal Years 1998-1999 and 1999-2000, SAM's General Budget included a  
2 separate capital budget for which allocation of costs was not based on flows but, instead, based  
3 on each member's ownership and capacity rights in SAM's treatment plant. O&M costs were  
4 still shared by all members. (*Id.*, ¶ 4, Exs. C, D.) Beginning in Fiscal Year 2000-2001,  
5 maintenance costs were allocated once again based on flows, including IPS repair and  
6 replacement costs. (*Id.*, ¶ 5, Exs. E-I.) This practice continued until Fiscal Year 2005-2006,  
7 when SAM again began to allocate capital costs based upon capacity in the SAM treatment plant.  
8 (*Id.*, ¶ 6, Exs. J-Q.) However, the members continued to share costs for IPS capital items except  
9 for costs related to a new project known as the Wet Weather Storage Project ("WWSP"), the  
10 costs of which were shared by Montara and Granada pursuant to the project budget process set  
11 forth in Article IV(B) of the JPA. (*Id.*, ¶ 7, Ex. R.) Beginning in Fiscal Year 2013-2014, capital  
12 items were once again based on flow (supported by legal opinions from SAM's counsel) (*id.*, ¶ 9,  
13 Exs. W, X) until 2017 when the instant dispute arose (*id.*, ¶ 8, Exs. S-V).

14  
15  
16  
17 Between 2010 and 2017, SAM's annual budget included several capital items for the IPS  
18 involving repair and replacement of components and the costs of these items were shared by all  
19 members, whether based on flows or capacity. (Fitzgerald Decl., ¶ 10, Exs. O at p. 45, T, U.)

20  
21 d. The Present Dispute

22 By 2017, portions of the IPS had eroded, resulting in wastewater spills in some locations  
23 and an estimated cost of \$4.4 million to replace those portions most in need of repair.

24 (Complaint, ¶ 3.) On October 9, 2017, SAM's board awarded a contract in the amount of  
25 \$1,997,050 to Bay Pacific Pipelines Inc. for the replacement of approximately one mile of force  
26 main segments, made necessary by recent spills resulting from corroded pipelines. (Jt. Ex. 48 at  
27 pp. JE158-160 [staff report]; Ex. 49 at p. JE212 [minutes].) The board also awarded a contract in  
28

1 the amount of \$30,378 to Blacoh Industries for replacement of a surge pump at the Portola Pump  
2 Station, which is part of the IPS. (*Id.*, Ex. 48, pp. JE206-207; Ex. 49, p. JE213.)

3 City representatives on the board voted in favor of awarding both contracts. (Jt. Ex. 49,  
4 pp. JE212-213.) However, the City later took the view that it was not responsible for  
5 contributing toward IPS maintenance costs despite having done so in the past, and initiated the  
6 instant litigation seeking a declaration that it is not responsible for repair and replacement of IPS  
7 components. The City's view is based on the following: its belief that the replacement of IPS  
8 components involves construction activities rather than maintenance activities and thus the work  
9 should not be paid for out of SAM's general budget but rather should be addressed through the  
10 JPA's project budge procedures where a member may opt out (Complaint, ¶¶ 18-27); its belief  
11 that the JPA obligates it to contribute to the maintenance of the IPS only for its "useful life,"  
12 which it is currently beyond (*id.*, ¶ 17); and its belief that it does not use or benefit from the IPS  
13 and therefore has no obligation to contribute to its upkeep (*id.*, ¶¶ 25, 27.)

## 17 2. Rules of Contract Interpretation

18 As this case rests on an issue of contractual interpretation, particularly that of the JPA and  
19 its provisions relating to costs and how those costs are to be borne by SAM's members, it is  
20 critical to lay out the well-settled rules of contractual interpretation that will apply here. **In short,**  
21 **the "fundamental canon of contract interpretation is the ascertainment of the parties' intent."**  
22 **(*Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1, 11.)** If clear and  
23 **explicit, the language of the subject agreement controls (see Civ. Code, § 1638), and generally**  
24 **the words are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense (*Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v.***  
25 ***Imperial Irrigation Dist.* (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 914, 931; Civ. Code, § 1644; Code Civ. Proc., §**  
26 **1861), unless a contrary intent is shown, such as a specialized meaning due to trade custom and**  
27  
28

1 practice or a prior course of dealing (*LaCount v. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co.* (1978) 79  
2 Cal.App.3d 754; Code Civ. Proc., § 1856, subd. (c).

3 The interpretation of a written construct is a question of law for the court unless such  
4 interpretation turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence. (*Parsons v. Bristol Development Co*  
5 (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865.) Extrinsic evidence is permissible where the terms of a contract are  
6 ambiguous (see *Vegas v. Western Employers Ins. Co.* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 922, 927), and a  
7 term qualifies as such when it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation (*Badie v.*  
8 *Bank of America* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 779, 798.) The determination of whether ambiguity  
9 exists in the first instance is solely a judicial function. (*Wolf v. Superior Court* (2004) 114  
10 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1343, 1350-1351.)

13 A court must view the language in light of the instrument as a whole, and not use a  
14 “disjointed, single paragraph, strict construction approach.” (*Ezer v. Fuchsloch* (1979) 99  
15 Cal.App.3d 849, 861.) If possible, the court should give effect to every provision (Civ. Code, §  
16 1641; *White v. Dorfman* (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 892, 897), though an interpretation which  
17 renders part of the instrument to be surplusage should be avoided (see *Estate of Newmark* (1977)  
18 67 CalApp.3d 350, 356).

### 20 3. Relevant Provisions of the JPA and the Parties' Interpretations

21 As set forth above, when interpreting the terms of an agreement, a court first begins with  
22 the words contained therein, understood in their ordinary and popular sense. In making its  
23 argument that the City's interpretation of the JPA is erroneous, Montara focuses on Article  
24 IV(B)(4) of the JPA, which provides as follows:  
25

26 In the event the member agencies choose to construct a single consolidated  
27 treatment plant facility .... [t]he total expenses of operation and maintenance of  
28 all of the components of the Present Project shall be shared in a manner based on  
the flows into the single consolidated treatment plant facility.



1  
2 (JPA Art. IV(B)(4); UMF No. 14)

3 “Present Project,” in turn, is defined earlier in Article IV(B) to include the IPS.<sup>3</sup> The members of  
4 SAM elected to construct a single consolidated system with only one treatment plant, and  
5 therefore, per the express terms of the JPA, all three have shared financial responsibility for  
6 operation and maintenance of the IPS based on flows, including replacement and repair of IPS  
7 force main segments and pumps.  
8

9  
10 Montara maintains that the drafters of the JPA intended the term “maintenance” to be  
11 understood in its broad, ordinary sense, i.e., to include everything necessary to maintain SAM’s  
12 treatment works in good condition. In contrast, the City asserts that the replacement of force  
13 main segments in the IPS is *not* mere operation and maintenance, but rather “construction” as  
14 defined in the “Definitions” section of the JPA, i.e., the “acquisition, reconstruction, alteration,  
15 enlargement, replacement or reparation as well as construction.” (JPA, Section I(d).) This  
16 distinction is critical because whether or not the cost of IPS repairs is to be shared or borne by  
17 just some of the members is dependent on how it is categorized within the meaning of the JPA.  
18

19 The JPA creates two types of budgets: general budgets and project budgets. (UMF No.  
20 2.) General budgets, described in Article V(A), are SAM’s annual budgets for administrative  
21 expenses and the expenses of operations and maintenance. The latter expenses are allocated  
22 based on flows into the Wastewater Treatment Plant, which the former are allocated based on  
23 each member’s voting rights on the SAM Board. Project budgets, described separately in Article  
24 V(B), are intended for new SAM projects, and include, among other things, the cost of  
25  
26

27  
28 <sup>3</sup> “The Present Project shall be a secondary wastewater treatment and disposal system, divided into four components to service the combined needs of the member agencies to the year 2000 .... Phase I of the system is composed of .... [a]n intertie pipeline and attendant pumping facilities ....” JPA at Art. IV(B)(1)(a)(i).)

1 construction of the project. Unlike general budgets, a member may opt out of a project for which  
2 a project budget has been prepared, and a SAM Board subcommittee of participating members  
3 would be formed to oversee the project.  
4

5 The City maintains that because the work that needs to be done on the IPS involves the  
6 replacement of parts, it qualifies as “construction” and thus is subject to a project budget that it  
7 can elect to opt out of. Montara asserts that because the work at issue in this action is for the  
8 maintenance of the existing IPS, the general budget process is implicated and the City is  
9 obligated to pay its share of costs based on flows into the Wastewater Treatment Plant.  
10

11 As set forth above, the City also bases its position on the notion that the IPS requires  
12 replacement of parts that have reached their “useful life” and therefore the project giving rise to  
13 this litigation and the costs incurred therein are not “the expenses of operating and maintaining  
14 improvements” or “general administrative expenses,” but rather a project that requires planning,  
15 engineering and construction costs to be funded by a project budget. With the foregoing in mind,  
16 the Court will discuss its conclusions below.  
17

18 *4. The Court Finds Montara’s Position Persuasive and Therefore Agrees that the*  
19 *City is Obligated to Share in the Costs of the IPS Project*

20 Without even considering the course of conduct between the members of SAM, the Court  
21 agrees with Montara that’s its interpretation of the relevant provisions of the JPA with regards to  
22 the work to be performed on the IPS is more reasonable.  
23

24 First, the Court agrees with Montara that support for the notion that the drafters of the  
25 JPA intended the term “maintenance” to be understood in its broad and ordinary sense is found  
26 within the agreement itself, particularly the categories of budgets created and the nature of those  
27 budgets as per the language used to describe them. The process of approving a project budget  
28 begins with the SAM Board approving a project “in concept.” (UMF No. 7.) As Montara

1 contends, approval of a project “in concept” signifies approval of one *not yet* in existence, i.e.,  
2 *new* projects, as distinct from the project at issue here, which is defined, presently existing, and  
3 one that SAM came together to build and maintain. Responsibility for construction and ongoing  
4 maintenance of the IPS is provided for in Article IV of the JPA, and thus there is no need to  
5 address governance of it through a subcommittee under Article VI. In short, project budgets are  
6 for new facilities/future projects and general budgets are for the present project, and because the  
7 costs of IPS repair and replacement cannot be described as administrative expenses, the category  
8 under which they must fit is operation and maintenance expenses, which is to be borne by all  
9 SAM members.  
10

11  
12 The City’s reliance on the “surplusage rule,” a rule of construction where every word of a  
13 contract or statute is assumed to have an independent meaning, does not compel the conclusion  
14 that the work to be done on the IPS qualifies as “construction.” The City argues that the JPA  
15 consistently distinguishes “construction” from “maintenance,” and cites to various provisions in  
16 the agreement in which these terms are listed separately, explaining that there would be no need  
17 to list them separately if the intention was that one was subsumed within the other. But as  
18 Montara notes, the surplusage rule is not as uncompromising as the City would have this Court  
19 believe, to wit: “While courts should strive to avoid constructions that make statutory words  
20 surplusage, this principle is merely a guide and should not be employed to defeat legislative  
21 intent.” (*People v. De Porceri* (106 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 60, 69.) Indeed, there are instances of  
22 redundancy of terms in the JPA which suggest that the surplusage rule should not have ironclad  
23 application to the interpretation of its terms. For example, the JPA provides that “The parties  
24 hereto have in common the power to plan for, acquire, *construct, reconstruct*, alter, enlarge,  
25 *replace, repair*, maintain, manage, operate and control facilities for the collection, transmission,  
26  
27  
28

1 treatment and disposal of wastewater.” (JPA, Art. II(C)(4).) Yet the JPA also defines  
2 “construction” to include “acquisition, *reconstruction*, alteration, enlargement, *replacement* or  
3 *reparation* as well as construction.” Notably, the City has not addressed this type of redundancy.  
4

5 The City’s assertion that making its ratepayers pay their share for the operations and  
6 maintenance is not “fair” because they derive no benefit from ignores the stated intent of SAM’s  
7 members as expressed within the JPA, particularly that “[i]n the event a single treatment plan  
8 concept was selected as the fourth component under Phase II, it is the intent of the Authority to  
9 further consolidate sewer functions within the service areas of the three member agencies, and to  
10 establish a uniform system of sewer service charges, levied throughout the entire jurisdiction of  
11 the Authority, with which to pay expenses of operations and maintenance.” (JPA, Art.  
12 IV(B)(5).) By choosing to apply uniform rates throughout SAM’s service area the member  
13 agencies, as Montara contends, intended that all of them were meant to be equally on the hook  
14 for SAM’s liabilities, including for the IPS. Moreover, the JPA does not otherwise limit the  
15 City’s responsibility to fund operations and maintenance work based on its perceived benefits,  
16 and it should be noted that the member agencies, back when they entered into the JPA, elected  
17 *not* to utilize a wastewater system that required each member to only pay for its use of facilities.  
18  
19

20 In any event, even if benefit *was* a relevant consideration, the Court is not persuaded by  
21 the City’s insistence that it derives no benefit from the IPS. SAM’s members elected to create a  
22 consolidated system and the IPS is what effectively consolidates it so that member agencies can  
23 share a single wastewater treatment plant. The City does not transport its own wastewater  
24 through the IPS because SAM’s treatment plant is located in the City itself and therefore  
25 transport is not necessary. If the plant had been located elsewhere, the City would require the  
26  
27  
28

1 IPS to transport waste, but the fact that Montara and Granada were willing to transport their  
2 waste instead is a material benefit to the City.

3 While the City also maintains that it was only required to fund operations and  
4 maintenance of the SAM IPS system during its useful life, and that that time has ended, not only  
5 does the JPA *not* specify what “useful life,” which appears in the Phase I cost allocation section  
6 of the JPA,<sup>4</sup> means, but a review of the statutory and regulatory environment in which the JPA  
7 was drafted supports the conclusion that the phrase “useful life” does not place an endpoint on  
8 the City’s obligation to share in the cost of operating and maintaining the components of the  
9 SAM wastewater system, including the IPS. The language of the JPA regarding operations and  
10 maintenance was created to comply with the May 10, 1979 preliminary injunction and to obtain  
11 federal and state Clean Water Grant Program funding. The injunction required the City, Granada  
12 and Montara to construct the SAM IPS, to be “operated and maintained by defendant Sam in  
13 accordance with the rules and regulations applicable to the California Clean Water Grants  
14 Program.” (UMF No. 35.) The Clean Water Grant Program approvals themselves explicitly  
15 required SAM to comply with all federal and state Clean Water Grant Program regulations. (See  
16 July 12, 1979 EPA Clean Water Grant Approval, requiring SAM to comply with “all applicable  
17 provisions of 40 C.F.R Chapter I, Subchapter B [the federal Clean Water Grant Program  
18 regulations].” (UMF No. 4.) Had SAM adopted contrary definitions of operations and  
19 maintenance, it would have suffered significant consequences.

20 **Clean Water Grant Program regulations specify that “[t]he term ‘operation and**  
21 **maintenance’ includes replacement” and define “useful life” as the “period during which the**  
22

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28 <sup>4</sup> Article IV(B)((1)(d)(iii), which pertains to operation and maintenance of Phase I components of the wastewater treatment and disposal system, states that, “Each member agency hereby agrees to utilize Phase I components as said components are completed and available for use, and to ensure the proper operation and maintenance of same in accordance with the requirements of the Regional Water Quality Control Board for the *useful life thereof*.”

1 treatment works will be operated” (40 C.F.R. § 35.905 (UMF No. 19), not just until the IPS  
2 needs repair or replacement, and RWQCB regulations further provide a definition of  
3 “rehabilitation” which “include[es] repair and replacement not considered routine or periodic”  
4 (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 23, § 2102, subd. (hh) (UMF No. 21)). These regulations also define  
5 “replacement” by citing and paraphrasing the definition provided by the federal regulations  
6 which, among other things, state that the term “operation and maintenance” *includes*  
7 replacement. Per the foregoing, repair, replacement and rehabilitation are all forms of  
8 maintenance of treatment works. Because SAM’s treatment works were intended to facilitate the  
9 members’ compliance with the aforementioned regulations, they establish the context in which  
10 the JPA was drafted and support the conclusion that the drafters of the JPA intended the term  
11 “maintenance” to be construed broadly.

14 In its opposition, the City emphasizes that the definitions in clear water regulations at the  
15 time JPA was drafted are irrelevant because they have since been rescinded, but the point is that  
16 they *were* in existence when the JPA was drafted, and thus provide relevant context and provide  
17 insight as to how the drafter intended the term “maintenance” to be construed.

19 The City also places emphasis on the statement in the JPA that the “Present Project” was  
20 intended to serve the member agencies’ needs through 2000 (see fn. 3, *supra*), arguing that the  
21 JPA was therefore only intended to govern initial construction of SAM’s system until that point  
22 in time, and not future related projects, including replenishment. But this statement refers to the  
23 *entire* Present Project, not just the IPS, and the Court agrees with Montara that the more  
24 reasonable interpretation of the statement is that it was intended to obligate the parties to create a  
25 system that would anticipated needs up to the year 2000, rather than establish an end point for  
26 the parties’ financial obligations for that system.

1 The Court also does not find persuasive the City's assertion that Montara is attempting to  
2 re-write the terms of the JPA, as its interpretation is based on the plain language of the  
3 agreement. If anything, the Court agrees with Montara that the City's interpretation is dependent  
4 on a revision of the JPA, especially given its appeal to "fairness," which has nothing to do with  
5 the plain language of the agreement.  
6

7 **In sum, the Court agrees with Montara that the costs of operations and maintenance of the**  
8 **Present Project, inclusive of the IPS, fall within Article IV(B)(4) of the JPA and thus are a joint**  
9 **responsibility of the member agencies. Thus, the City cannot decline to contribute its share of**  
10 **the cost for repairs of the IPS, including the replacement of components that require as much.**  
11

12 **Montara's motion for summary judgment, joined by Granada, is GRANTED.**

13 **III. Granada's Motion for Summary Judgment**

14 **A. Requests for Judicial Notice**

15 In connection with Granada's motion for summary judgment, both Granada and the City  
16 make requests for judicial notice.  
17

18 First, in support of its motion, Granada requests that the Court take judicial notice of the  
19 City's Complaint and its own Cross-Complaint. As these items are court records, they are proper  
20 subjects of judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d). Accordingly,  
21 Granada's request is GRANTED.  
22

23 In support of its opposition to Granada's motion, the City submits a request for judicial  
24 notice that is identical to the request it submitted in support of its opposition to Montara's motion  
25 for summary judgment. For the same reason set forth above in the preceding section, the City's  
26 request for judicial notice is GRANTED.  
27  
28

1           **B. Analysis**

2           Granada’ motion for summary judgment relies on essentially the same theory as  
3 Montara’s, that is, the plain language of the JPA supports the conclusion that “Operations and  
4 Maintenance” includes the “Repair, Rehabilitation, and Replacement” of consolidated treatment  
5 works such that the City is obligated to bare its share of the cost to make repairs to the IPS. As  
6 articulated above, the Court finds this interpretation of the JPA both reasonable and persuasive.  
7 Accordingly, Granada’s motion for summary judgment, joined by Montara, is GRANTED.  
8

9           **IV. The City’s Motion for Summary Judgment**

10           **A. Requests for Judicial Notice**

11           In connection with the City’s motion, both the City and Montara submit requests for  
12 judicial notice.  
13

14           First, the City requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following items, which  
15 are attached the declarations of John Doughty (the “Doughty Decl.”) and Pamela Graham (the  
16 “Graham Decl.”) filed in support of its motion for summary judgment: the City’s Complaint  
17 (Exhibit A to Graham Decl.); Montara’s Cross-Complaint (Exhibit B to Graham Decl.);  
18 Granada’s Cross-Complaint (Exhibit C to Graham Decl.); SAM’s IPS Review and Evaluation  
19 Report dated December 2009 prepared by SRT Consultants, attached to the January 25, 2010  
20 SAM Board Meeting Agenda for Item No. 6A (Exhibit D to Graham Decl.”); engineering  
21 drawings of Granada Force Main Replacement Project dated August 2017 (Exhibit E to Graham  
22 Decl.); Stipulation and Order Regarding Expenses and Assessments of Sewer Authority Mid-  
23 Coast dated August 21, 2017 (Exhibit F to Graham Decl.); the City’s protest letter to SAM dated  
24 July 10, 2018, accompanying the City’s payment for operations and maintenance for the month  
25 of June 2018 (Exhibit G to Doughty Decl.); staff report for the May 18, 2021 City Council  
26  
27  
28



1 Meeting, when the City adopted a resolution to approve under protest the SAM General Budget  
2 for fiscal year 2021-2022 (Exhibit H to Doughty Decl.); SAM General Budget for fiscal year  
3 2021-2022 (Exhibit I to Doughty Decl.); and City Resolution No. C-2021-22, approving under  
4 protest the SAM General Budget for fiscal year 2021-2022 (Exhibit J to Doughty Decl.).  
5

6 Exhibits A, B, C and F are court records and therefore proper subjects of judicial notice  
7 under subdivision (d) of Evidence Code section 452.

8 Government records are judicially noticeable pursuant to Evidence Code sections 451,  
9 subd. (a) and 452, subds. (b) and (c). Evidence Code section 452 provides that the Court may  
10 take judicial notice of “(b) Regulations and legislative enactments issued by or under the  
11 authority of the United States or any public entity in the United States.” The Court may notice  
12 relevant portions of a city’s or joint powers authority’s staff reports and legislative enactments.  
13

14 (*Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach* (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1225  
15 [judicial notice of staff report]; see *Trinity Park, L.P. v. City of Sunnyvale* (2011) 193  
16 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1027 [applying Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (b) and (c) to “local ordinances and  
17 the official resolutions, reports, and other official acts of a city.”].) The authority to take judicial  
18 notice, includes those government records published on the internet. (See, e.g., *People ex rel.*  
19 *Totten v. Colonia Chiques* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 31, 38, fn. 3.) Exhibits D, E, G, H, I and J fall  
20 into this category.  
21

22 In accordance with the foregoing, the City’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED.  
23

24 Next, in support of its opposition, Montara requests that the Court take judicial notice of  
25 the existence and contents of the Declaration of Christine Fitzgerald filed in support of its motion  
26 for summary judgment. This request is GRANTED. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (d) and (h).)  
27  
28

1           **B. Analysis**

2           The arguments asserted by the City in support of its motion are the same as those that it  
3 asserts in opposition to Montara's and Granada's summary judgment motions. That is, it  
4 maintains that it is not obligated to pay for any portion of repairs to the IPS because such repairs  
5 qualify as new "construction" under the JPA rather than maintenance. However, for the reasons  
6 articulated in detail above in the section pertaining to Montara's motion, the Court does not find  
7 this interpretation of the JPA to be reasonable. Consequently, the City's motion for summary  
8 judgment is DENIED.  
9

10  
11  
12 Date: FEB 04 2022



13  
14 The Honorable Christopher G. Rudy  
15 Judge of the Superior Court  
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**SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA**  
DOWNTOWN COURTHOUSE  
191 NORTH FIRST STREET  
SAN JOSÉ, CALIFORNIA 95113  
CIVIL DIVISION

**FILED**

FEB 07 2022

Clerk of the Court  
Superior Court of CA County of Santa Clara  
BY R. Belligan DEPUTY

RE: **City of Half Moon Bay vs Granada Sanitary District et al**  
Case Number: **17CV316927**

**PROOF OF SERVICE**

**ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION** was delivered to the parties listed below the above entitled case as set forth in the sworn declaration below.

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If you, a party represented by you, or a witness to be called on behalf of that party need an accommodation under the American with Disabilities Act, please contact the Court Administrator's office at (408) 882-2700, or use the Court's TDD line (408) 882-2690 or the Voice/TDD California Relay Service (800) 735-2922.

**DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL:** I declare that I served this notice by enclosing a true copy in a sealed envelope, addressed to each person whose name is shown below, and by depositing the envelope with postage fully prepaid, in the United States Mail at San Jose, CA on February 07, 2022. CLERK OF THE COURT, by Richelle Belligan, Deputy.

cc: Christine Carin Fitzgerald Fitzgerald Law Offices PO Box 1366 Burlingame CA 94010  
Michael George Colantuono Colantuono Highsmith & Whatley PC 420 Sierra College Dr Grass Valley CA 95945-5091  
Jeremy Nathan Jungreis Rutan & Tucker LLP 18575 Jamboree Road 9th Floor Irvine CA 92612  
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